Marriage: female submission or mutual submission?

Some passages talks about the wife submitting to the husband, while another passage talks about both husband and wife submitting to each other. What can we conclude from this? There are to possible guiding contexts, corresponding to egalitarianism and complementarianism, respectively:

1. Some passages forbid both sexual immorality and drunkenness. Other passages forbid only sexual morality. But both are equally forbidden, and forbidden in the same sense. The presence and omission of each precept was based on the context: which precept the audience needed to hear. Similarly, both husband and wife ought to submit to each other in the same sense, yet wifely submission was enjoined especially because it needed to be heard.

2. The two commands about submission take place in two different textual contexts. And in these two textual contexts, submission takes on two related but different meanings. Therefore the husband’s submission to the wife is very different than the wife’s submission to the husband.

I’m not sure what I think about egalitarianism vs complementarianism in general. But on this particular question, it seems that both contextual differences are true, which means that the correct interpretation is somewhere in the middle.

Inequality, inherited wealth, and the family

Material inequality is one of the great bugbears of the Left. While certain left-leaning economists claim that inequality damages the economy, the case against inequality is fundamentally a moral one. The unequal distribution of wealth is claimed to be unfair, the product of nepotism rather than merit. In its defense, libertarians argue that it is an inevitable outcome of individual liberty and property rights. They (and most economic conservatives) also oppose government efforts to eradicate inequality on more pragmatic grounds, such as the incompetence of government administrators or as a step towards totalitarianism. Many social conservatives, however, are more open to wealth redistribution, being less individualistic in spirit than their libertarian friends.

What both libertarians and traditionalists have missed is that the defense of material inequality can and must be based on a defense of the family and its foundational role in society. For if society is ultimately composed of atomic individuals, then the Rawlesian case against material inequality has real merit. Suppose society were truly composed of individuals that are born into a world of individuals. Then society is arranged horizontally, like a ream of papers: individuals born in 1985, individuals born in 1986, and so on. Looking within each sheet of paper we see a great injustice: some individuals are born with privilege, and others without. All this lumpiness within sheets is arbitrary, without any regard to either earned merit or the likelihood that inherited wealth will be used optimally. This collides unhappily with the libertarian ideals of meritorious success and economic efficiency.

Now instead imagine society from the traditionalist perspective. A baby is not born into the group of babies born in 1985, but to a mother and father. Or more accurately, the baby is born into a family, composed not just of her parents, but to their parents, and so on. Society is thus not a heap of papers, but a rope composed of many separate threads passing through time. The goal of civilization is fundamentally not about achieving evenness within each sheet of paper, but about making the rope stronger by strengthening each of its component threads.

From this perspective, inheritance is one of the fibers that binds together different generations into one strand. In the era before industrialization and urbanization, this fiber was more concrete and visibly apparent, since the inheritance was most likely not some generic liquid investment, but a plot of land, a livelihood, and a location that was one’s (and one’s parents’) home in the world.

Opposition to material inequality is necessarily an argument against inherited wealth and privilege. And opposition to inherited wealth is predicated on an understanding of society directly contrary to the traditional perspective just described. From the leftist perspective, a society with inherited wealth makes no more sense than an imaginary society where the inheritances of all people who die in 2016 is randomly swapped among all their descendants. From this perspective, a uniform distribution among all people born in 1985 therefore makes better sense than any alternative. Thus, to oppose inherited wealth is to deny the legitimacy of the family as the basic, enduring unit of civilization.

In contrast, conservatives defend inherited wealth not merely because individuals have a right to choose on whom to pass their wealth. We do so because parents typically pass on their wealth to their children, in accord with the role of the family as the basic atomic unit of society. We are outraged when one individual robs another individual, cutting one strand in the rope of society. But we are even more opposed when the government weakens or abolishes inherited wealth, damaging or breaking all strands of the societal rope.

Thus, there is an underlying logic to the coalition between fiscal conservatives and social conservatives, a real unity between two of the legs of the conservatism’s “three-legged stool.” The converse is also true. Our friends on the left may not discern it themselves, but both their economic and cultural policies undermine the role of family in society.

In the words of Edmund Burke, the father of conservatism, society is “a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born.” This unity across generations exists because it has an internal structure: that of the family. To conserve society, we must conserve this internal structure, through conservative policies, both social and economic.

Same-sex civil unions and anti-discrimination laws

Those who accept same-sex civil unions admit that in a civil sense, a man-woman union and a same-sex union are the same thing. This retreat undermines religious liberty.

Consider the following beliefs, which are common even among conservative Christians:

  1. The government should recognize civil unions which treat gay and straight couples equally.
  2. The government may (or even should) punish discrimination on the basis of innate differences.
  3. Sexual orientation is at least partially innate, beyond an individual’s control.

I will argue that if one accepts all three premises, then the following is implied:

  • Wedding photographers and bakers should punished for only offering their services to straight weddings.

Premise 3 is a matter of scientific debate, but is commonly held and has some merit. Premise 2 is popular except among the most strident libertarians, and has been legally established since the 1960s. In contrast, Premise 1 is not a scientific hypothesis, but instead a philosophical/theological claim, and one that was until recently opposed by essentially all orthodox Christians.

The sudden recent acceptance of Premise 1 is reason alone to give us pause. But the argument I will make in this post should make us even more wary. Indeed, the sudden acceptance of same-sex civil unions is often an attempt for a truce between LGBT activists and Christians who oppose gay marriage and want to preserve their religious liberty. However, if my argument is valid, then accepting gay civil unions actually undermines the basis of religious liberty with respect to “anti-discrimination” laws.


 

Why is it illegal for McDonald’s to refuse service to black people? Why is it legal for McDonald’s to refuse to serve pizza to customers? In the former case, the same product is being served, and the business is discriminating among different customers. In the latter case, however, we consider pizza and hamburgers to be two different products. McDonald’s cannot be legally required to offer a product. However, if it offers a certain product, legally it must offer that product to everyone without exception.

This distinction requires a civil judgment on whether something is a “different product” or the “same product offered to only some people.” For example, the government would regard a restaurant selling a “whites-only eating experience” as merely cover for offering an eating experience only to white people.

How does this all relate to same-sex civil unions? Those who accept same-sex civil unions are admitting that in a public, civil sense, there is no difference between a man-woman union and a same-sex union. They may still maintain that the Bible treats the two differently and that Christians are only allowed one but not the other. Yet to accept same-sex civil unions is to confess that there is no publicly-recognizable ontological difference between a man-woman union and a same-sex union. The two types of partnerships should be treated by the government as really the same thing.

Now let us consider a wedding photographer in our world where there is (to the eyes of the government) only one type of civil union, encompassing both straight and gay partnerships. She (to the government) offers a single type of product: photographs of celebrations of unions. If she refuses to take pictures for a same-sex nuptial, she is really just refusing to offer her product to gay customers. Assuming Premise 3, she is discriminating against a class of people whose identity is at least partially beyond their control. Thus, according to Premise 2, her actions ought to be illegal.


 

How do we respond to this? We must maintain that there is an ontological difference between a straight lifelong monogamous marriage and all other types of sexual partnerships, and that in fact the latter are not “unions” at all. We must argue that this distinction is not just spiritual, not just a moral requirement for Christian individuals or churches, but a real intrinsic difference that must be recognized by the government. We must hold that this difference is visible, and that our society can and should see it, if only we would open our eyes to the truth. A viable defense for religious liberty can be found only by reclaiming this lost ground.